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The present study examines the association between Earnings Management and 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Moreover, and relying on previous studies, it is 
investigated if the corporate social responsibility orientation of a firm moderates the 
trade-off between accruals and real earnings management. Thus, it is considered a sample 
of 308 listed companies from the European Union between 2013 and 2019. As a measure 
of discretionary accruals, it is used the modified Jones model (1991) as developed by 
Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1995). As a proxy for real earnings management, 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) combined measure with three components is used. Corporate 
social responsibility is computed using the ESG Score from the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Database. The results suggest a negative relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and earnings management in general. By analysing the trade-off between 
both earnings management strategies, results suggest that socially responsible firms 
engage less in real activities management. This study contributes to the literature by 
considering that the corporate social responsibility orientation of a firm moderates the use 
of accruals and real earnings management. Results are robust after considering a different 
measure of real earnings management and after altering sample composition. Therefore, 
the evidence is consistent with the idea that socially responsible activities are associated 
with ethical behaviors and are not used as a concealing instrument to less honorable 
practices.  
 
Keywords: earnings management, corporate social responsibility, accruals earnings 
management, real earnings management.  
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O presente estudo analisa a relação entre Gestão de Resultados e Responsabilidade Social 
Empresarial. Para além disso, e com base em estudos anteriores, é investigado se a 
orientação para responsabilidade social de uma empresa condiciona o trade-off entre 
gestão de resultados por accruals e gestão de atividades reais. Assim, é considerada uma 
amostra de 308 empresas cotadas da União Europeia para o período de 2013 a 2019. 
Como medida de accruals discricionários é usado o modelo de Jones modificado (1991), 
como descrito por Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1995). Como medida de gestão de 
atividades reais é usada a medida combinada com três componentes como descrita por 
Roychowdhury (2006). Finalmente, como medida de responsabilidade social empresarial 
recorre-se ao ESG score divulgado na base de dados Thomson Reuters Eikon. Os 
resultados sugerem uma relação negativa entre responsabilidade social empresarial e 
gestão de resultados no geral. A análise da relação de trade-off entre estratégias de gestão 
de resultados sugere que as empresas praticam menos gestão de atividades reais. Isto traz 
contributos adicionais à literatura por considerar que a orientação para responsabilidade 
social de uma empresa modera o uso das estratégias de gestão de resultados. Os resultados 
são robustos depois de considerar uma medida diferente para gestão de atividades reais e 
depois de alterar a composição da amostra. Como tal, a evidência é consistente com a 
ideia de que as atividades consideradas socialmente responsáveis estão associadas a 
comportamentos éticos por parte das empresas e não são uma tentativa de ocultar práticas 
menos corretas.  
 
Palavras Chave: gestão de resultados, responsabilidade social empresarial, accruals 
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  The traditional theory of the firm presents profit maximization as the ultimate 
goal of a company. In this context, earnings play an important role when assessing firm 
value. For instance, earnings are used by stakeholders to evaluate management’s 
performance and determine executive compensation, which induces incentives to report 
pleasing earnings (Xu, Taylor & Dugan, 2007). Earnings management (EM) occur when 
managers use their judgment on the financial reporting process to obtain some private 
gain (Schipper, 1989).  
Over the past few decades, the growing concerns about the environment and 
sustainability have contributed to the rising importance of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). As a result, stakeholders request for transparency on all aspects of 
the business, not only to understand the financial position and performance of the firm 
but also to measure the level of social responsibility. Carroll (1991) affirms that social 
responsibility commitment will lead companies to make profit, behave ethically and 
legally. Thus, socially responsible activities allow companies and managers to enhance a 
reliable position amongst stakeholders.   
Several empirical researches aim to study whether EM and CSR are connected. 
Although CSR is generally perceived to be associated with transparent and honest 
financial reports (Kim, Park & Wier, 2012), some authors declare that managers take 
advantage of this perception to hide less ethical practices. Prior, Surroca & Tribó (2008) 
and Choi, Lee & Park (2013) claim that managers who pursuit private benefits use CSR 
strategically to disguise their opportunistic behavior. However, the most frequent 
standpoint is that EM and CSR are negatively related, i.e., firms with strong commitment 
to CSR are disposed to act in a responsible way when reporting financial statements and 
will not distort earnings (Kim et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2013; Toukabri, Jilani & Jemâa, 
2014; Almahrog, Aribi & Arun, 2018). Bozzolan, Fabrizi, Mallin & Michelon (2015) and 
Mutuc, Lee & Tsai (2019) do not completely discard the possibility of EM on CSR-
oriented firms. These authors argue that, in the case of practicing EM, managers from 
CSR-oriented firms will manage accruals rather than real operations in order to protect 
firm’s long-term profitability. This perspective comes in line with the idea of two 
substitute ways to manage earnings: accruals and real activities (Zang, 2012).  
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All this considered, this work proposes to examine the association between 
earnings management and CSR. The research considers that the CSR-orientation of a firm 
constrains the use of EM in general. More than that, it is considered that CSR restrains 
actions that will harm the company’s future performance. Therefore, and considering the 
trade-off between EM strategies, it is expected that CSR-firms will less likely engage in 
real operational decisions than in accruals.  
The sample is composed of 308 listed firms from the European Union, resulting 
in a number of 1,347 firm-year observations, for the period of 2013-2019. Accruals-based 
earnings management is calculated using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney, 1995). Real earnings management is computed following Roychowdhury’s 
model (2006) as an aggregate measure of abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. As a measure of CSR, Thomson 
Reuters ESG score is used in the analysis and corresponds to a percentile ranking across 
ten categories of social responsibility.  
In order to test our hypotheses and relying on previous studies (e.g. Kim et al, 
2012), two models were estimated using multiple regressions with standard errors 
adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels. Our evidence suggests 
that CSR-firms do not behave opportunistically. Also, larger firms with more growth 
opportunities are less willing to manage accruals and firms with better performance, more 
growth opportunities and audited by a Big Four auditor do not distort real activities. These 
findings are robust for a different measure of REM, with two components of the combined 
variable, and for a different sample composition.  
Much of prior literature neglects the possibility to manage earnings through real 
operations and focuses mainly on discretionary accruals (e.g. Chih, Shen & Kang, 2008; 
Prior et al., 2008; Calegari, Chotigeat & Harjoto, 2010; Gras-Gil, Manzano & Fernández, 
2016). In this study, by using a combined measure of REM (Roychowdhury, 2006) and 
the measure for discretionary accruals as described by the modified Jones model (Jones, 
1991; Dechow et al., 1995), both earnings management strategies are studied. Therefore, 
the study extends the literature by studying the association between EM and CSR 
considering the trade-off between AEM and REM practices. Moreover, aware that the 
majority of studies center on an American context (Yip, Van Staden & Cahan, 2011; Kim 
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et al., 2012; Bozzolan et al., 2015), this empirical work contemplates a sample of firms 
from the European Union. 
This study is organized into five sections. Section two contains the literature 
review regarding the topic of Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility 
and culminates with the development of the research hypotheses. The third section 
presents the research design, including the sample characterization, the variables 
measurement and the empirical models. The fourth section contains the results and 
robustness tests and, finally, section five concludes the empirical research.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Earnings management 
Accounting earnings have become an important instrument to evaluate corporate 
performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Financial statements are regulated by accounting 
standards that enable a certain level of flexibility, where managers and accountants make 
choices regarding what practices to adopt. In this context, when managers use such 
discretion over the accounting numbers, the conception of earnings management (EM) 
arises (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).  
 Throughout the literature, EM has been defined in multiple ways. According to 
Schipper (1989, p. 92), EM is a “purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. This intervention may 
be intended to either mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company, or to control contractual outcomes dependent on reported accounting 
practices (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
The definitions presented above highlight significant features of EM practices. 
EM refers to a deliberate behavior with the ultimate purpose to modify reported earnings 
and, therefore, it is different from unintentional errors (Marai & Pavlović, 2013). Apart 
from that, Dechow & Skinner (2000) emphasize that EM – which is possible within the 
boundaries of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999) - diverges from the concept of fraud – which clearly proves an intent to deceive 
beyond the acceptable.     
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Prior literature assumes two predominant perspectives on EM: the opportunistic 
behavior and the signaling perspective (Holthausen, 1990). The opportunistic behavior 
perspective is based on the premise that managers try to misinform investors, in order to 
pursuit their own private welfares at the expense of stakeholders (Schipper, 1989; Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999). On the contrary, in line with the signaling perspective, executives use 
their knowledge and judgments on transactions to communicate with outsiders, by 
releasing inside information to investors, such as expectations regarding future cash flows 
and the firm’s future performance (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983). The prevailing 
research relies on the view that managers opportunistically benefit themselves (Beneish, 
2001). Information asymmetry inhibits stakeholders to access relevant information and 
to monitor manager’s actions, which creates the opportunity to manage earnings 
(Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995, Richardson, 2000; Sun & Rath, 2008). 
Matsumoto & Parreira (2007) argue that managers practice EM due to the lack of 
accounting standards for all possible situations, combined with economic and financial 
incentives. By using EM practices, it is possible to artificially modify results to meet 
analyst’s forecasts, which may result in aggregated value for the firm (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). Further motives to the practice of EM concern contractual constrains 
dependent on reported values and financial advantages, such as low financing costs and 
easy access to credit (Dechow & Sloan, 1996). Jaggi & Lee (2002) argue that EM is 
implemented in financial distressed firms to avoid debt covenants violations. 
Alternatively, Healy (1985) suggests that managers choose to adjust earnings in order to 
maximize their remuneration, since compensation incentives often rely on indicators such 
as price per share (Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Mendes & Rodrigues, 2006). Also, 
managing earnings not always means presenting boosted profits. For instance, when it is 
not possible to meet the targets for a particular year, managers can implement “big bath” 
practice and save earnings for a posterior period (Guidry, Leone & Rock, 1999). 
Despite the motive, when companies manage earnings, the quality of financial 
statements may be reduced through lack of accuracy, relevance and reliability (Marques 
& Rodrigues, 2009). As a consequence, the ability to assess the current economic 
situation of a firm as well to predict its future earnings and cash flows may be 
compromised (Lev, 2003).  
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2.1.1. REM and AEM strategies 
Managerial actions can either involve real earnings management (REM) and/or 
accruals-based earnings management (AEM) strategies (Bozzolan et al., 2015).  The 
former is related to cash flows from business transactions, whilst the latter refers the 
accrual part of earnings.   
REM, or real earnings management, consists on deviating from the normal 
operational decisions to alter reported earnings, which ultimately deceives stakeholders 
by believing that the desired financial goals were achieved (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Amongst others, these actions include reducing discretionary expenditures, such 
as advertising costs, or aggressive price discounts to increase product sales 
(Roychowdhury, 2006).  
AEM, or accruals-based earnings management, is related to a change in the 
accrual process. Accruals are the difference between the firm’s net income and cash flows 
and are decomposed in nondiscretionary and discretionary (Yip et al., 2011). 
Nondiscretionary accruals reflect the economic variations related to the company’s 
activity (Healy, 1985). As for discretionary accruals, these refer to the adjustments not 
economically justified made by managers (Dechow, Ge & Schrand, 2010). Thus, AEM 
strategies rely on discretionary accruals, through the modification of estimates, 
assumptions and accounting methods dependent on the manager’s judgment (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). Examples of these techniques include changing estimates regarding the 
useful life and the method of depreciation and impairments of non-current assets.  
Executives who choose to depart from optimal operational choices may put at risk 
future cash flows and alter the firm’s operational, investment and financing structure, in 
order to obtain greater earnings in the current period (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). Despite the true economic consequences, Graham et. 
al (2005), through a survey conducted to CFOs1 of U.S. listed companies, reported that 
these are more prone to apply REM than AEM to achieve financial reporting targets. One 
possible explanation to the preference of REM is that AEM is prone to additional risks 
and costs regarding auditing and regulatory scrutiny (Cohen, Dey & Lys, 2008), while 
 
1 CFO as Chief Financial Officer. 
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REM is more difficult to detect (Bozzolan et al., 2015). Cohen et al. (2008) observed that 
SOX2 caused executives to shift from accrual-based to real earnings management, 
suggesting the preference for strategies underlying real business transactions when the 
level of enforcement is high. However, despite the emergent use of REM techniques, 
most of EM occurs through discretionary accounting choices since they do not impact 
cash flows, are less costly and less resource-consuming (Mendes & Rodrigues, 2006; 
Chen, 2009).   
Zang (2012) claims that REM and AEM are used as substitute strategies to distort 
earnings. If REM reveals to be costlier than managing accruals, the latter is applied to a 
higher extent and vice versa. From this point of view, REM is limited by levels of industry 
competition, tax rates and financial distress (Zang, 2012). The adoption of AEM 
strategies is dependent on accounting flexibility and the degree of auditors and regulators’ 
control (Zang, 2012). Following this premise, Joosten (2012) finds that European firms 
use REM to reduce earnings during the year, and then apply upward AEM at the end of 
the fiscal year to achieve the desired results.  
On the contrary, Mizik & Jacobson (2007) defend that given the variety of ways 
to distort earnings, managerial decisions probably include multiple techniques at the same 
time. The authors contend that these tools are used as complementary, firstly to increase 
earnings and then to maximize firm value. Additionally, Chen, Huang & Fan (2012) 
documented that managers jointly and simultaneously employ both strategies to obtain 
the greatest effect in the process of earnings reporting. Nevertheless, Fields, Thomas & 
Linda (2001) explains that, in order to investigate the overall effect of EM activities, 
studying only one technique is insufficient, especially if managers use both AEM and 
REM to accomplish the same objective. 
2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility 
According to Carroll (1979, p. 500), “The social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary [philanthropic] expectations 
 
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) is a U.S. federal law created after financial scandals involving publicly traded 
companies, such as Enron Corporation. The main purpose of SOX was to restore the integrity of financial 
statements by restraining earnings management and accounting fraud (Cohen et al., 2008). 
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that society has of organizations at a given point in time”. This definition is generally 
accepted in the contemporary literature.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) entails companies voluntarily taking 
actions that comprise environmental protection, moral issues, relations with the 
community, human resources management and other aspects (Castelo & Lima, 2006) 
which, subsequently, will offer social good beyond the firm’s interests and law 
requirements (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). Socially 
responsible activities taken by companies include, for instance, participating in social 
campaigns, reducing the use of non-recyclable and non-reusable materials, embracing 
environmental targets and providing healthcare assistance for employees.  
One factor that has contributed to the rising importance of CSR is the concern on 
sustainability (Yip et al., 2011). The term sustainable development refers to a 
development that attends to the needs of present generations without jeopardizing the 
capacity of future generations to correspond theirs (WCED, 1987). The “triple bottom 
line” approach recognizes three elements companies should take into consideration when 
assessing their sustainability goals: profit, people and the planet (Elkington, 1994). Still, 
it is important to acknowledge that, although sustainability and social responsibility have 
similar conceptualizations of economic, social and environmental dimensions, the terms 
do not strictly cover the same issues (Montiel, 2008). This study goes in line with the 
definition that CSR integrates social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer 
concerns, as well as shareholders’ wealth (European Commission, 2011).  
Besides making morally acceptable decisions, CSR-oriented firms are concerned 
in satisfying the demands of the diverse parties and, therefore, will not engage in 
transactions harmful to stakeholders (Bansal & Kandola, 2004; Branco & Rodrigues, 
2006). In such a manner, engaging in socially responsible activities, along with improving 
corporate image and reducing financial risk, also improves stakeholder satisfaction 
(Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). Hence, the firm will benefit from the support of 
different stakeholders: greater employee commitment, customer loyalty and collaboration 
from partners (Prior et al., 2008).  
The engagement with CSR became a way to endorse firm’s legitimacy (Grougiou, 
Leventis, Dedoulis & Owusu-Ansah, 2014). Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) defined 
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legitimacy as a resource that is essential for organizational continued existence. By 
engaging in socially responsible activities, companies establish a trustworthy image and 
expand the ability to negotiate contracts with suppliers, to charge the desired prices for 
their products and to reduce cost of capital (Fombrun & Gardberg, 2000).  
Lev et al. (2010) assume that CSR activities are implemented to develop firm’s 
reputation because managers believe a good reputation leads to sales growth. Other 
researchers (e.g. Paine, 1994; Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang & Yang, 2012) suggest 
that the voluntary disclosure of CSR reports with GRI3 complements financial statements, 
which may indicate greater integrity over earnings reporting. On the other hand, Prior et 
al. (2008) go further and state that managers use CSR to obtain favorable coverage from 
the media, legitimacy from the community and less scrutiny from employees and 
investors. From this point of view, socially responsible activities can be used to conceal 
the negative impact on firm value of some corporate misconduct (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers., 
1995).  
2.3. Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility   
Literature concerning the association between CSR and EM is ample, but the 
results are mixed. For instance, Almahrog et al. (2018) revealed that UK companies with 
a higher commitment to CSR activities are less likely to manage earnings through 
accruals. On the other hand, Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal (2005) claim that CSR-oriented 
firms would prefer to employ AEM because REM would sacrifice the firm’s long-term 
performance. Furthermore, other literature (Hong & Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012) 
corroborates the idea that CSR constrains both REM and AEM. However, it is important 
to be careful when generalizing results due to the diversity of samples contemplated on 
the various studies – for instance, some rely on multinational firm data, others in U.S. 
firms, others in Asian firms (Choi et al, 2013). Salewski & Zülch (2014) mention a 
potential explanation for the inconsistency within the existing research. Based on a 
sample of European firms applying International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
the authors argue that country-specific characteristics moderate the association between 
 
3 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an organization that developed a program of global 
standardization for economic, environmental and social sustainability reporting. 
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CSR and earnings quality. Different theorical perspectives applied as foundation for 
research on this topic are explored hereafter. 
The conflicts of interest driven by the separation of ownership and management 
of a company, along with information asymmetry, expand the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior by the manager (agent) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency problems occur 
when managers pursue self-serving goals rather than maximizing the shareholder’s 
wealth (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Various authors (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 
Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2010) point that increasing the information transparency and 
accountability are possible solutions to enable shareholders and other stakeholders to 
detect harmful actions. Given this premise, disclosure of information regarding social 
responsibility becomes a form of reputation insurance (Kim et al., 2012), potentially 
encouraging managers who distort earnings to disguise their misconduct through CSR.  
This argument, in accordance with the managerial opportunism hypothesis, was 
used as a starting point to the studies of Prior et al. (2008) and Calegari et al. (2010). Prior 
et al. (2008) claim that executives engage in EM and, therefore, implement CSR 
activities, to compensate stakeholders for their detrimental actions.  Similarly, Calegari 
et al. (2010) start by assuming CSR as a principal-agent problem. The authors also present 
the possibility of CSR being part of corporate culture, thus being exercised despite of the 
agency problem. The findings suggest that CSR positively enriches the earnings reporting 
quality, contrarily to what was expected from the theorical stand. In the same line, the 
findings from Toukabri et al. (2014) were contradictory to the theorical framework. 
Focusing on the agency problem, the empirical evidence indicates that CSR activities do 
not encourage managerial discretion and discretionary accruals are not positively related 
to CSR.  
The long-term hypothesis, associated with the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984), suggests that firms should be focused on fostering long-term relationships with 
stakeholders (Gras-Gil et al., 2016). In this regard, CSR is seen as an investment, which 
will intensify social legitimacy and earnings quality, thus providing proper information 
to stakeholders (Kim et al., 2012; Gras-Gil et al., 2016). Based on this, Chih et al. (2008) 
explore the extent of the relationship between CSR and EM. The authors claim that a 
greater commitment to CSR reduces the extent of earnings smoothing, a form of EM that 
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consists on moving revenues and expenses from one accounting period to another. Further 
that, their research suggests an inverse relationship for moderate levels of CSR, but a 
positive association for high levels of CSR, i.e., executives only perform EM to achieve 
social, environmental and economic aims. Hong & Andersen (2011) investigate the 
association between CSR and EM, considering both accruals-based and activities-based
 EM. From the sample of non-financial U.S. firms from 1995 to 2005 and using KLD4 
data as a proxy for CSR, they find that companies committed to CSR have greater quality 
accruals and less activity-based EM. Likewise, Choi & Pae (2011) and Gras-Gil et al. 
(2016) find that socially responsible firms have low incentive to manage earnings. 
Choi et al. (2013) suggest two possible scenarios. The first one where the long-
term hypothesis is dominant and, so, a negative association between CSR and EM is 
expected. The second one where the authors present the possibility of CSR as mechanism 
to hide opportunistic behavior by managers. Findings show that CSR is negatively related 
with the level of EM, when all non-financial Korean firms from the sample are 
considered. Additional evidence suggests that CSR practices can be used by firms with 
highly concentrated ownership to conceal poor earnings quality.  
Ethical, political and integrative theories of CSR offer valuable insights for the 
research of CSR and EM.  Jones (1995) recognizes that CSR firms have an incentive to 
be honest, trustworthy and ethical because such behavior is beneficial to the firm. In this 
context, Kim et al. (2012) argue that CSR-oriented firms are more disposed to restrain 
EM and to make responsible operating decisions, thereby presenting reliable financial 
information. Alternatively, the authors also present the hypothesis of CSR engagement 
induced by managerial opportunism. Empirical findings suggest that firms are less willing 
to manage earnings through discretionary accruals and to alter real business transactions.   
EM alters the information available for stakeholders and society as a whole in 
respect to the firm’s value, assets, transactions or financial position (Zahra, Priem & 
Rasheed, 2005). To this point, EM can deceive and mislead investors which is considered 
unethical and irresponsible (Kaplan, 2001). In agreement with ethical, political and 
integrative perspectives as well with previous findings (Hong & Andersen, 2011; Choi & 
 
4 KLD - Kinder, Lydenberg & Domini is a database that incorporates environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) factors. It is mainly used in the United States of America.  
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Pae, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Gras-Gil et al., 2016), it is possible to argue that ethical 
concerns will drive executives to produce high-quality financial reports and, 
consequently, constrain the use of EM. Therefore, in order to protect corporate reputation, 
a negative relation between CSR and EM is expected. The following hypothesis is 
presented:  
H1: Corporate social responsibility is negatively associated with earnings 
management. 
CSR orientation seems to prevent the use of both REM and AEM, still, it is unclear 
whether it happens in different patterns. Bozzolan et al. (2015) extend the literature by 
analyzing the relationship between CSR and EM, considering that a firm’s CSR 
orientation may also shape the trade-off between AEM and REM. The research was based 
on an international sample of 1141 firms, over the period 2003-2009. CSR data were 
obtained from the EIRIS5 database, AEM was measured using the modified cross-
sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) and REM was measured 
following Cohen et al. (2008) and Roychowdury (2006). Results show that, assuming that 
some form of EM will occur, CSR shapes the choice between EM strategies. The concern 
with the impacts on the long run will drive companies to apply AEM rather than REM. 
This suggests that CSR can create value for the stakeholders by selecting accounting 
strategies and the trade-offs amongst them (Bozzolan et al., 2015). 
Likewise, Mutuc et al. (2019) investigate the effects of CSR on EM through 
accruals and operating decisions. The study examines a sample of 558 firms, from eleven 
Asian countries, listed in the Thomson Reuters ESG database. CSR was measured using 
ESG score and earnings management was measured applying two proxies. The first one 
regarding discretionary accruals and the second one for REM. This research provides 
consistent findings within the ones resulted from the work of Bozzolan et al. (2015). 
Overall, Asian firms prefer to apply discretionary accruals since all accruals can be 
reverted in the future periods. Contrarily, real operating decisions not only deteriorates 
stakeholder’s satisfaction, but also compromises actual company resources (Mutuc et al., 
2019). 
 
5 EIRIS - Environmental Information Resources System.  
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Prior literature suggests a positive association between CSR and performance (e.g. 
Orlitzky et al., 2003), i.e., CSR heightens the concerns about the continuity of the firm. 
Recognizing that REM will affect the firm’s long-term performance, we believe that 
CSR-oriented companies will less likely adopt REM practices (Porter & Kramer, 2006; 
Hong & Andersen, 2011). Assuming that some sort of EM will occur, socially responsible 
firms will prefer accruals to REM because strategies underlying real operations will cause 
detrimental consequences on future performance (Graham et al., 2005) and, unlike REM 
practices, the effects of accruals can be reverted. Aligned with the findings of preceding 
literature (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Mutuc et al., 2019), it is possible to argue that CSR-
orientation and, thus, the commitment towards stakeholders, guides companies to worry 
about the firm’s future viability and competitiveness (Porter & Kramer, 2006). It is 
expected that CSR-orientation will restrain the use of REM. Hence, the subsequent 
hypothesis is developed:  
H2: Corporate social responsibility restrains the use of real earnings 
management.   
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample characterization 
Financial and accounting data as well as data from social responsibility were 
retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon database, also known as Refinitiv Eikon, during 
the month of June 2020. Period sample was from 2013 to 2019, in order not to consider 
the potential effects of the crisis.  
On a first instance, all public companies from the European Union (EU) with 
accounting, financial and CSR data (ESG score) available were selected, except 
companies from the financial sector and public administration, since these have unique 
characteristics and specific regulations which may affect the results of this research (Prior 
et al., 2008; Hong & Andersen, 2011; Almahrog et al., 2018). It is important to refer that 
this sample includes companies from the United Kingdom (UK) since, for the period in 
analysis, UK was still a member of the EU. The initial sample was of 1,130 companies.  
The selected companies use the IFRS and the currency is Euro. Additionally, all 
firms which did not present enough data to calculate the metrics of discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management were excluded. Also, countries and industries with less 
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that 6 firm-year observations were eliminated from the sample (Almahrog et al., 2018). 
Therefore, companies from Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia were 
removed from our sample as well the sector of Real State. This sample follows the GICS6 
sector classification because NACE Rev.27 classification was not available for all 
companies on the database.  
Taking into consideration the potential effects of outliers, the necessary data values 
for the calculation of AEM, REM and the independent variables not included between the 
percentile 1 and 99 were removed.  
Thus, the final sample consists of 308 listed firms, from 16 EU countries and 9 
different sectors, corresponding to a number of 1,347 firm-year observations.  
Appendix I displays the distribution of observations across countries. A large 
amount of the sample is represented by companies from Germany (18.56%), the United 
Kingdom (16.41%) and France (14.92%). Appendix II contains the list of sectors of 
activity, following GICS sector classification. The most represented sectors are 
Industrials (26.28%), followed by Materials (13.96%) and Communication Services 
(12.92%).  
3.2. Variables measurement  
3.2.1. Accruals-based earnings management  
Relying on previous studies (Prior et al., 2008; Gras-Gil et al., 2016; Bozzolan et 
al., 2015), this study uses discretionary accruals to estimate EM. The Jones model (Jones, 
1991) is broadly used in EM research and splits accruals into their discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components. More specifically, in this analysis the modified cross-
sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991) as described by Dechow et al. (1995) is used to obtain 
the total accruals, due to its greater specification and less restrictive data (DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994).  
The accrual component of earnings is computed as:  
 
6 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is classification system by economic sector and industry 
group, developed by MSCI and Standard & Poor's (S&P). 
7 NACE Rev.2 - Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Union - is the standard 
system used in the EU to classify industries. 
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𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  =  (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) − (∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 (1)  
For each company i and year t: TA refers to total accruals; ∆𝐶𝐴 is the change in 
current assets; ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ is the change in cash; ∆𝐶L is the change in current liabilities; ∆STD 
is the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities and 𝐷𝑒𝑝 is the depreciation 
and amortization.  
The main difference between the Jones model (1991) and the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) is that the latter includes revenues as a discretionary element. 















           Where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the value of total accruals deflated by total assets for firm i in the 
beginning of year t. 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total assets at the beginning of year t for firm i. ΔREVi,t 
is the variation in revenue between the prior year (t-1) and the current year (t) for the firm 
i. 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the variation in receivables between the prior year (t-1) and the current year 
(t) for the firm i. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
is the firm’s (i) regression error in period t. As it is possible to observe, all the variables 
are deflated by lagged total assets (𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) in order to control to control potential size 
differences of a given company that affect the estimate of accruals (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Prior et al., 2008).  
Discretionary accruals are computed as the residual value of the regression (2) (i.e. 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡). In order to consider both the extent of EM and the direction of EM, the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (AEM) and the signed value of discretionary accruals 
(DACC) are used. A high value of absolute discretionary accruals means a superior level 
of earnings management, or lower quality of earnings, and vice versa (Gras-Gil et al., 
2016).  
Hence, the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AEM) for firm i in year t is 
defined as:  
𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = | 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 |    (3)  
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3.2.2. Real earnings management 
Roychowdhury (2006) develops a widely accepted model to measure REM, applied 
by several authors in their empirical works, such as Cohen et al. (2008), Zang (2012), 
Bozzolan et al. (2015) and Mutuc et al. (2019). Specifically, Roychowdhury (2006) used 
an aggregate measure that combined three ways to detect REM: abnormal levels of 
operating cash flows, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.  
Roychowdhury (2006) argues that sales management activities will cause lower 
current period operating cash flows due to aggressive price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms. This practice allows firms to boost current year sales by accelerating the 
ones from the next fiscal year (Gunny, 2005). Increased sales will be reverted once the 
normal prices are restored.  
Dechow, Kothari & Watts (1998)’s model implemented by Roychowdhury (2006) 
is used to estimate the normal operating cash flows (CFO) as a linear function of sales 
and changes in sales in the current period. Hence, the following cross-sectional regression 
for industry and year is used to estimate the model:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1











Where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 refers to the operational cash flows of firm i in year t. 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is the 
total assets for the same firm i in the prior year. 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the total sales of organization i in 
year t and ∆𝑆𝑖𝑡 refers to the variation in sales (𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) of organization i in the prior 
year.  
In accordance with Roychowdhury (2006), all the dependent and independent 
terms from the equation above (4) are divided by lagged assets (𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) to control potential 
size differences of a given company.  
Abnormal cash flows from operations (AB_CFO) are the deviations from the 
normal levels of cash flow (Dechow et al., 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006). AB_CFO is 
calculated using estimated coefficients from the corresponding industry-year model and 
the firm-year’s sales and lagged assets. This is given by:  
AB_CFOi,t = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 (5)  
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A second measure of REM is the abnormal production costs. Roychowdury 
(2006) states that overproduction is another method companies may use to increase 
earnings in the current year. High production levels will decrease fixed costs per unit 
since these costs are spread over more units. The incremental marginal costs incurred in 
producing additional inventories result in abnormally high production costs 
(Roychowdury, 2006). 
 Prior studies (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012; 
Bozzolan et al., 2015) define production costs (PROD) as the sum of cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and the change in inventory between year t and year t-1 (∆INV).  
Following these studies, normal COGS is computed by:  
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1






+ 𝜇1𝑖,𝑡 (6)  
Likewise, the model for normal inventory growth (∆INV) is estimated as: 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1









+ 𝜇2𝑖,𝑡 (7)  
            Using the estimated coefficients from Equation (7) and Equation (8), for every 
industry-year, normal production costs (PROD) are computed as followed:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1














The abnormal level of production costs (AB_PROD) is calculated by the actual 
production costs minus the normal level of production costs. For simplification, it is 
presented as:  
𝐴𝐵_ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (9)  
            As to the third measure of REM, discretionary expenses, according to 
Roychowdhury (2006), when managers reduce discretionary expenditures to meet 
earnings targets, the value of these expenses should be unusually low. Discretionary 
expenses are the sum of research and development costs (R&D), advertising costs (ADV) 
and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A).  
For every firm-year, the normal level of R&D, advertising and SG&A costs is 
given by Equation (12), (13) and (14), respectively.  
MARIA VERÓNICA FARIA DE SOUSA 






























+ 𝛾3𝑖,𝑡  (12) 
Following Roychowdhurry (2006), as long as the values for SG&A are available, 
it is possible to calculate the value of discretionary expenses. If values for R&D and ADV 
are missing, these will assume the value “0”. Therefore, using the estimated coefficients 
from Equations (12), (13) – when existing - and (14), the normal level of discretionary 
expenses (DEXP) is given by the following industry-year regression:  
𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1








Thus, for every firm-year, abnormal discretionary expenses are given by:  
𝐴𝐵_ 𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖,𝑡  (14) 
In line with previous studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Bozzolan et al., 
2015), an aggregate measure of individual real activities management proxies is used in 
this analysis. Considering the direction of each REM components, the combined measure 
(COMBINED_REM) is calculated as AB_CFO – AB_PROD + AB_DEXP. The combined 
measure decreases when companies engage in EM through real activities, i.e., higher 
levels of overall REM imply more reluctance regarding the use of operating decisions 
(Kim et al., 2012). For simplification, this measure is labeled as REM in the empirical 
models.  
3.2.3. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Considering the theoretical contribution of Carroll (1979) and the empirical work 
done by Gargouri, Shabou & Francoeur (2010) and Mutuc et al. (2019), this study 
contemplates the multidimensional nature of CSR and takes into consideration three 
attributes to assess corporate behavior: environmental, social and governance (ESG). The 
Thomson Reuters ESG database has as an extended worldwide coverage and provides 
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reliable, up-to-date and accurate information from more than 6,000 public companies 
with reported data since 2002 (Sikacz & Wolczek, 2018; Mutuc et al., 2019). 
Thomson Reuters ESG Scores are an improved version of the existing ASSET4 
ratings as they measure a company’s relative ESG performance across ten main ESG 
themes. There are three categories of ESG indicators in the Thomson Reuters Eikon: the 
ESG score, the ESG controversies (ESGC) score and the combined score (ESG+ESGC) 
(Sikacz & Wolczek, 2018). The ESGC score measures the exposure of a company to ESG 
controversies and the negative events reflected in global media (Thomson Reuters, 2019). 
Since the purpose of this study is to study the relationship between EM and CSR rather 
than the effect of EM in the reputation of companies, the ESG score is solely used. This 
score contemplates a scope of information from ten categories: resource use; emissions; 
innovation; management; shareholders; CSR strategy; workforce; human rights; 
community and product responsibility. 
The score calculation follows the percentile rank scoring methodology, i.e., each 
company is ranked according to its performance in each category comparing to the others. 
The score is then calculated based on the following model:  
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +  
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
2
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 (15) 
The ESG score (CSR_score) is later conversed to a letter grade in a scale from D- 
to A+ for a range of values. The score measures the ESG results of companies based on 
publicly available data, contemplating issues associated with materiality, availability of 
data and significance to the sector (Thomson Reuters, 2019).  
3.2.4. Control variables  
Considering the effect of potential correlated omitted variables, several control 
variables regarding the incentives and restrictions involved in the process of EM are 
incorporated in this analysis.  
Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that firm-specific growth opportunity can 
potentially explain significant variation in EM. Skinner & Sloan (2002) claim that 
companies with growth opportunities are penalized by the stock market when the 
forecasted earnings are not met. Some studies (e.g. Chih et al., 2008; Van Tendeloo & 
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Vanstraelen, 2008) indicate that growing firms have more incentives to engage in EM 
because these firms are under greater pressure to maintain or increase their profitability 
rate. Hence, the variable GROWTH is included to control for firm’s growth prospects and 
is calculated as the percentage change in total revenues between year t-1 and year t. It is 
expected a positive relationship between GROWTH and EM.  
The study controls for SIZE, a variable incorporated to represent the firm’s size as 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Larger companies are subject to potential scrutiny 
from investors, auditors and regulators (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Based on this 
premise, Gras-Gil et al. (2016) argue that closer control by outsiders reduces the 
opportunity to exercise accounting discretion in larger firms and, therefore, it is expected 
a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and firm size.  
The variable LEV represents the financial leverage, measured by the long-term debt 
to total assets ratio. Prior research (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Park & Shin, 2004) 
suggests that managers may adjust earnings upwards to avoid violations of debt covenants 
and the risk of bankruptcy. These arguments would predict a positive relationship 
between discretionary accruals and financial leverage (Gras-Gil et al., 2016). However, 
the findings from the study of Toukabri et al. (2014) indicate that more leveraged firms 
engage less in EM because they are prone to strict monitoring by creditors and other 
stakeholders. As so, there is no agreement in the literature concerning the impact of 
financial leverage of a firm on EM.  
To control for performance, the variable ROA (return on assets) is included and 
measured as the ratio between net income and total assets. A higher ROA value indicates 
that a business is more profitable and efficient. According to Dechow et al. (1995), 
discretionary accruals are correlated with performance. Orlitzky et al. (2003) point that 
ROA is an indicator subject to manager’s discretionary choices. Prior et al. (2008) argue 
that managers use EM to boost profits. Toukabri et al. (2014) found that a company with 
good financial performance, will not distort earnings. Chen (2010) argues that companies 
with low profitability tend to manage earnings. After all, the expected signal of the 
correlation between financial performance and EM is not obvious.  
It is expected that firms audited by large audit firms might have a different behavior 
towards EM. Previous research (Bonner & Lewis, 1990; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; 
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DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998) suggest that larger audit firms have more experienced, 
specialized and conservative auditors. Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam 
(1998) and Krishnan (2003) find that high-quality and experienced auditors are more 
probable to detect questionable practices and object to the use of EM, thus influencing 
earnings quality. Therefore, the dummy variable BIG4 is included and assumes the value 
“1” if the auditor is a Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise.  
The extent of EM may vary across industries (Almahrog et al., 2018), which is why 
the model controls for industry (IND). Following Bozzolan et al. (2015), the variable IND 
is computed as a dummy variable that includes the industry sensitiveness of CSR 
orientation. This means that this variable assumes the value “1” if the firm’s industry is 
considered socially and environmentally sensitive and the value “0” if not. For the 
purpose of this classification and following previous studies (e.g.: Freedman, Jaggi & 
Stagliano, 2004; Brammer & Millington, 2005; Cho & Patten, 2007; Bozzolan et al., 
2015), socially and environmentally sensitive industries are the extractive (mining and 
petroleum), metals, chemicals, paper, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, utility and 
defense. 
Furthermore, since there are country-specific characteristics that may potentially 
moderate the use of EM (Prior et al., 2008), the variable COUNTRY and the variable 
YEAR are introduced to control for country and year fixed effects.   
3.3. Empirical Models 
In order to test the relation between EM and CSR in financial reporting, the 
following models are estimated:  
𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌
𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
(16) 
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𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡





The variables are calculated as previously described in section 3.2.  
Equations (16) and (17) are estimated with OLS regressions. Following Cohen et 
al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2012), in order to control for the substitute nature of these two 
earnings management methods, AEM, a proxy for accruals-based EM, is used as a control 
variable for real activities management (i.e. REM) regressions and a proxy for REM is 
used as a control variable in the AEM regressions.  
According to previous literature (Kim et al., 2012; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Mutuc et 
al., 2019), H1 is verified if  𝛽1 is negative and significant for Equation (16) and positive 
and significant for Equation (17).  
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I reports descriptive statistics. The mean value of the absolute discretionary 
accruals is 0.0595 and the mean of signed discretionary accruals is 0.0056. This suggests 
that, on average, managers tend to practice income increasing accruals. The mean values 
of AB_CFO, AB_PROD, AB_DEXP and REM are 0.6119, 0.0382, -0.1127 and 0.0754, 
respectively, suggesting that, on average, firms do not seem to engage in real activities 
management such as sales manipulation. 
Regarding the variable of interest CSR_Score, European firms have an average ESG 
score of 0.2263. This value is greater than the one presented by Mutuc et al. (2019) 
because it does not include the ESG controversy score.  For the control variables, on 
average, the firms included in the sample present an annual sales growth of 3.32% and 
the natural logarithm of total assets, SIZE, has a mean value of 22.7606. In addition, the 
average leverage of sample firms is 20.90% which suggest that firms are not in risk 
concerning long-term debt to total assets. The mean value of ROA is 4.52%. Thus, the 
sample is mainly composed of large and profitable firms. Also, 81.74% of the sample 
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firms are audited by a Big Four firm and 31.77% belong to an industry sensitive to CSR 
orientation.  
Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
AEM 1,347 0.0595 0.0413 0.0594 0.0001 0.4451 
DACC 1,347 0.0056 0.0025 0.0839 -0.3686 0.4451 
AB_CFO 1,347 0.0382 0.0322 0.1184 -0.6075 0.9831 
AB_PROD 1,347 -0.1127 -0.0794 0.2066 -1.2715 0.7423 
AB_DEXP 1,347 0.0754 0.0420 0.1418 -0.3345 0.7573 
REM 1,347 0.2263 0.1606 0.3591 -0.6565 1.9059 
CSR_Score 1,347 0.6119 0.6319 0.1790 0.0033 0.9513 
GROWTH 1,347 0.0332 0.0291 0.1539 -0.7803 2.3461 
SIZE 1,347 22.7606 22.5883 1.4396 19.0505 26.6925 
LEV 1,347 0.2090 0.1901 0.1369 0 0.8154 
ROA 1,347 0.0452 0.0396 0.0849 -0.6228 1.5857 
BIG4 1,347 0.8174 1 0.3865 0 1 
IND 1,347 0.3177 0 0.4658 0 1 
Variables: AEM is the absolute value of discretionary accruals; DACC is signed discretionary accruals; CSR_Score 
is score of ESG rating. REM is sum of real earnings management proxies, abnormal cash flows (AB_CFO) plus 
abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_DEXP) minus the abnormal production costs (AB_PROD). GROWTH is 
percentage change in sales. SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total long-term debt to total assets ratio. 
ROA is ratio between net income and total assets. BIG4 dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company is audited 
by a Big Four firm and “0” otherwise. IND dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company’s industry is CSR 
sensitive and “0” if not. 
4.2. Correlation Matrix 
Appendix III presents Pearson correlation coefficients among Earnings Management 
Proxies, CSR Score and control variables.  CSR_Score is negatively and significantly 
correlated with AEM. This suggests that CSR oriented firms are less likely to engage in 
accruals earnings management. AEM is also negatively and significantly correlated with 
SIZE and LEV. This suggests that larger and more indebted firms are less likely to manage 
accruals.  
The correlation matrix shows that REM is negatively and significantly correlated with 
SIZE, LEV and IND, meaning that larger, riskier and industry sensitive firms are more 
probable to practice real activities management. The positive and significant correlations 
between REM and GROWTH, ROA and BIG4 reveal that larger firms, with better financial 
performance and audited by a Big Four are less likely to manage earnings through real 
operations.  
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It is possible to identify the absence of strong relationships between the variables of 
interest and other variables since the value of correlations is low (<0.6). This can be ensured 
by the variance inflation factors presented on Appendix IV (VIF<5) regarding the 
independent variables for each model, which lead us to reject the possibility of 
multicollinearity in the subsequent regressions.  
4.3. Regression analysis 
Table II reports the results of the multivariate regression of earnings management 
regressions. In order to control for a possible heteroscedasticity problem, model (16) and 
model (17) are estimated using pooled OLS regression with standard errors clustered at firm 
and year level and with year and country fixed effects (Bozzolan et al., 2015).  
In respect of AEM regressions, the results are reported using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and the direction of discretionary accruals.  
Table II. Results from the AEM multiple regressions on CSR 


































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,347 1,347 
R-squared 0.1180 0.3199 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0986 0.3049 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at firm year level. T-stat values are in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The expected signal column refers to the 
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magnitude of accruals and REM. Variables: AEM is the absolute value of discretionary accruals; DACC is signed 
discretionary accruals; CSR_Score is score of ESG rating. REM is sum of real earnings management proxies, 
abnormal cash flows plus abnormal discretionary expenses minus the abnormal production costs. GROWTH is 
percentage change in sales. SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total long-term debt to total assets ratio. 
ROA is ratio between net income and total assets. BIG4 dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company is audited 
by a Big Four firm and “0” otherwise. IND dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company’s industry is CSR 
sensitive and “0” if not. 
Column 1 shows that there is a negative and significant relation between the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, AEM, and CSR_Score. This suggests a negative 
relation between the magnitude of accruals EM and CSR, consistent with H1. In terms of 
the direction of discretionary accruals, a positive and significant relation between DACC 
and CSR_Score is found, indicating that CSR firms engage more in income increasing 
earnings management than in income decreasing accruals. This is consistent with Chih et 
al. (2008) findings that, for certain levels of CSR, companies engage in earnings 
aggressiveness.   
Regarding the proxy for real activities manipulation, REM, it is negatively and 
significantly associated with the accrual-based earnings management in DACC regression. 
This suggests that European firms use both EM strategies as substitutes, supporting a trade-
off between discretionary accruals and real activities decisions. These findings are 
consistent with Kim et al. (2012), Zang (2012) and Bozzolan et al. (2015).  
As to the control variables, GROWTH and SIZE are negatively associated with AEM, 
suggesting that firms with growth opportunities and larger firms are less likely to engage in 
earnings management through accruals. This is consistent with previous studies (Gras-Gil 
et al., 2016) that argue that larger firms have less opportunities to manage accruals.    
For the DACC regression, there is a negative and significant relation between DACC 
and GROWTH, SIZE and LEV. It is possible to link these results with the logic of cookie 
jar, indicating that firms that beat the expected growth rates are more likely to manage 
earnings downward, as well as larger and more indebted firms. In terms of IND, the 
coefficient is positively correlated with the direction of accruals (DACC), suggesting that 
firms from industries sensitive to CSR-orientation are more likely to manage earnings 
upward. 
The variation of the magnitude of the discretionary accruals can be explained in 
11.80% by the regression model presented in column (1) that includes both year and country 
fixed effects. In terms of the direction of the discretionary accruals, these can be explained 
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by 31.99%. It is important to denote that R2 is higher in this last regression, but still reduced, 
which is coherent within the literature regarding this topic (e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2015).  
The results of REM regressions are presented in table III. The results are reported 
using the combined measure of REM and the level of abnormal cash flows, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Table III. Results from the REM multiple regressions on CSR 
Variable Expected Signal 
REM AB_CFO AB_PROD AB_DEXP 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
constant  
1.2705*** -0.4066*** -0.8718*** 0.8053*** 
(6.53) (-6.52) (-7.70) (10.30) 
CSR_Score  +  
0.2558*** -0.0163 -0.1331*** 0.1390*** 
(3.84) (-0.89) (-3.37) (4.93) 
AEM +  
-0.0098 -0.0994 0.0317 0.1213 
(-0.05) (-1.03) (0.27) (1.48) 
GROWTH - 
0.1771*** -0.0503* -0.1551** 0.0723** 
(2.79) (-2.38) (-3.24) (2.94) 
SIZE ?  
-0.0532*** 0.0202*** 0.0389*** -0.0345*** 
(-5.89) (7.09) (7.44) (-9.09) 
LEV ? 
-0.0782 -0.0545* -0.0420 -0.0657* 
(-1.12) (-2.46) (-1.02) (-2.47) 
ROA ? 
1.4740*** 0.8176*** -0.4871*** 0.1693* 
(5.43) (7.25) (-4.32) (2.36) 
BIG4 + 
0.0506** 0.0177** -0.0237 0.0092 
(2.19) (2.70) (-1.71) (1.01) 
IND + 
-0.1669*** -0.0410*** 0.0730*** -0.0529*** 
(-9.87) (-6.94) (6.71) (-7.40) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,347 1,347 1,347 1,347 
R-squared 0.2818 0.4336 0.1927 0.2221 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2660 0.4212 0.1749 0.2049 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
For the regressions of REM and AB_DEXP, the estimated coefficients for CSR_Score 
are positive and significant, as expected. As to the abnormal production costs, these are 
negatively and significantly related with CSR_Score. It is important to consider the 
direction of the proxy of REM, in which a higher (lower) level of abnormal expenses 
(abnormal production costs) and the combined measure indicate more cautious choices. 
Therefore, consistent with Kim et al. (2012) and Bozzolan et al. (2015), these findings 
reveal that CSR-oriented firms engage less in real activities distortion.  
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GROWTH and ROA present positive and significant coefficients for the REM 
regression, evidencing that firms with higher growth opportunities and better performance 
are less likely to engage in REM. As to the variable SIZE, the outcomes suggest that larger 
firms practice more REM than smaller ones (p-value <0.05). In terms of IND, the coefficient 
is negative and significant, suggesting that companies from industries sensitive to CSR 
engage more in activities management.  
AB_CFO coefficient is negatively related with industry and leverage and positively 
related with performance, size and BIG4. Larger firms, firms with better performance and 
firms audited by a BIG4 are less likely to engage in sales manipulation, whilst more 
leveraged firms are more prone to distort sales. This supports the statement that a rigorous 
auditing control leads to less sales manipulation, as suggested by Becker et al. (1998) and 
Krishnan (2003).  
AB_PROD coefficient is negatively correlated with growth and performance. This 
indicates CSR-oriented firms are less likely to manage activities through overproduction as 
well as firms with more growth opportunities and better efficiency on assets.  
Finally, AB_DEXP coefficient is positively and significantly correlated with 
GROWTH. This denotes that socially responsible firms as well as firms with growth 
opportunities are less willing to reduce discretionary expenses.  
The variation of the level of activities management can be explained in 28.18% by 
the regression model presented in column (3) that includes both year and country fixed 
effects.  
Hence, these findings are consistent with H1 and H2 that state that socially 
responsible firms are less prone to manage their earnings and are less likely to use real 
activities management.   
4.4. Additional analyses 
4.4.1. Different measure of REM  
On this section, considering the lack of information on the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
regarding some data for the second measure of REM, the abnormal production costs are not 
considered in the aggregated measure used as a proxy for REM.  Therefore, and considering 
the direction of each REM components, the combined measure (COMBINED_REM) is now 
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calculated as AB_CFO + AB_DEXP. The results are presented in Appendix V. As it is 
possible to observe, the number of observations increases with this modification.  
Although a negative but not significant relation is found between the magnitude of 
accruals and CSR, the results suggest that CSR-oriented firms are more prone to manage 
earnings upward. Furthermore, the findings go in line to what was previously found, i.e., 
CSR-oriented firms do not engage in real activities distortion. As a whole, concerning REM 
regressions, the results were very similar to those of the main analysis. 
Regarding the substitute nature of the two methods of EM, the findings are consistent 
with Kim et al. (2012), Zang (2012) and Bozzolan et al. (2015). The negative and significant 
coefficients in both AEM and REM regressions suggest that European firms use both 
strategies as substitutes, supporting a trade-off between discretionary accruals and real 
activities decisions.  
In terms of the control variables LEV and ROA, which had no significant relation in 
the prior AEM regressions, the coefficients are now negative and significant for LEV and 
positive and significant for ROA. This is consistent with Takoubri et al. (2014) and Prior et 
al. (2008) that argued that more leveraged firms practice less in accruals contrarily to firms 
with better performance. 
4.4.2. Robustness analysis  
In order to test the robustness of our results and given that a large part of the 
sample is constituted by companies from Germany (18.56%), firms belonging to this 
country are removed from the analysis. The results are presented on Appendix VI. 
The outcomes are substantially robust when compared with the main analysis. For 
the level of significance of 10%, CSR_Score is negatively correlated with AEM. 
Meanwhile, for the level of significance of 1%, CSR_Score is positively correlated with 
REM. These results support the hypothesis that CSR-oriented firms are less likely to 
manage earnings (H1).  
5. CONCLUSION 
The present study examines the relation between EM and CSR. Based on the 
premise of the financial reporting transparency, it is hypothesized that CSR-oriented 
firms are worried about the company’s reputation and the relationship with stakeholders. 
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Hence, managers from CSR-firms are worried about the company and its relationship 
with the society in general, not only about delivering attractive results to shareholders. 
Moreover, it is argued that managers of socially responsible firms are attentive on the 
firm’s future performance and will not engage in practices harmful for the continuity of 
the firm (Bozzolan et al., 2015). 
Overall, within the European firms from the sample, the results show that EM is 
negatively related with CSR. These findings are in conformity with the hypothesis that 
CSR-oriented firms do not engage in earnings management, specifically engage less in 
real earnings management. This could be explained in part by the fact that REM present 
higher costs in the long-term performance of the companies. As the matter of fact, ROA 
is significantly correlated with REM which indicated that more profitable firms are less 
likely to engage in strategies underlying real operations. Since previous literature 
documents a positive relation between CSR and performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003), 
responsible firms will behave ethically and cautious about the consequences of these 
practices on the long run. This is also coherent with our standpoint that CSR-firms are 
transparent when delivering financial information and with a large part of literature (Kim 
et al., 2012; Hong & Andersen, 2011; Choi et al., 2013; Toukabri et al., 2014; Gras-Gil 
et al., 2016; Almahrog et al., 2018).  
On one hand, higher levels of CSR seem to be related with higher levels of 
prudency on using REM strategies. However, on the other hand, there seems to be a 
moderate relation between CSR and discretionary accruals. This would entail that these 
firms apply earnings management upward for certain levels of CSR, as suggested by Chih 
et al. (2008).  
Several firm characteristics were also controlled, such as financial performance, 
size of the firm, level of indebtedness and growth opportunities. Firms with growth 
prospects engage less in both AEM and REM practices. Although these firms are under 
more pressure to reach forecasts (Chih et al., 2008), the level of inquiry is high and could 
jeopardize future results. Consistent to what is expected (Watts & Zimmerman, 1999 & 
Gras-Gil et al., 2016), larger firms are more likely to engage in REM than in AEM. Since 
these firms are more prone to scrutiny and control, managers choose practices harder to 
detect, i.e., real activities management. Regarding the level of indebtedness, and 
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contrarily to what is predicted by Gras-Gil et al. (2016), there is a negative relationship 
between the direction of accruals and the financial leverage ratio. Once again, this could 
be explained because more leveraged firms are under strict monitorization which restricts 
managing earnings upward.  
All this considered, these findings support the idea that CSR activities are aligned 
with the organization’s purpose and vision and are not driven by managerial opportunism. 
Also, it seems to contemplate the long-term hypothesis, which coincides to the previous 
literature that supported this work (Kim et al., 2012 and Bozzolan et al., 2015).  
The results are strengthened after altering the measure of REM and considering 
only two components of REM, abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary 
expenses. The results are also robust to the modification of sample composition.   
This study intends to address concerns from previous literature. The present research 
considers two estimates of EM, discretionary accruals and REM, and the trade-off amongst 
them, i.e., the use of these strategies as substitutes, where firms choose the one that is less 
costly to them (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Specifically, REM was presented as a 
combined measure of three components, following Roychowdhury (2006). Using this 
measure suggested that, for instance, CSR-oriented firms do not manage activities through 
overproduction and are less disposed to alter the value of discretionary expenses.  
As a limitation for this study, I identify the lack of information regarding the ESG 
score. This is due to inconsistent metrics which do not take into account distinct 
regulatory regimes across different countries, causing different definitions of what 
constitutes ESG for companies (Doyle, 2018; Mutuc et al., 2019). Additionally, the 
absence of information about some components of AEM and REM such as cost of goods 
sold and advertising costs, for the period of 2011-2012, caused a number of observations 
lower than initially expected.  
Future research should expand this study by investigating the relationship between 
Earnings Management, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial 
Performance. If possible, contemplating a higher number of observations. This would 
revise the results from this study that suggest a negative relationship between financial 
performance and REM. 
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7. APPENDIX 
Appendix I. Sample distribution by country 
Country # of obs. % of sample 
AT Austria 21 1.56% 
BE Belgium 32 2.38% 
DK Denmark 47 3.49% 
FI Finland 93 6.90% 
FR France 201 14.92% 
DE Germany 250 18.56% 
GR Greece 13 0.97% 
IE Ireland 11 0.82% 
IT Italy 62 4.60% 
LU Luxembourg 24 1.78% 
NL Netherlands 71 5.27% 
PL Poland 31 2.30% 
PT Portugal 23 1.71% 
ES Spain 136 10.10% 
SE Sweden 111 8.24% 
UK United Kingdom 221 16.41% 
Total 1,347 100% 
 
Appendix III. Distribution of Firm-Year observations by Sector of activity 
Code Sector of Activity (GICS) # of obs. % of sample 
50 Communication Services 174 12.92% 
25 Consumer Discretionary 134 9.95% 
30 Consumer Staples 113 8.39% 
10 Energy 92 6.83% 
35 Health Care 126 9.35% 
20 Industrials 354 26.28% 
45 Information Technology 47 3.49% 
15 Materials 188 13.96% 
55 Utilities 119 8.83% 
Total 1,347 100% 
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Appendix III. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
  AEM CSR_Score REM GROWTH SIZE LEV ROA  BIG4 IND 
AEM 1 
        
CSR_Score -0.1998*** 1 
       
REM 0.0589**   -0.0350 1 
      
GROWTH -0.0454*  -0.0893*** 0.0960*** 1 
     
SIZE -0.2789*** 0.5686*** -0.1881***  -0.0709*** 1 
    
LEV -0.1012*** 0.0831***  -0.1417*** 0.0330  0.1700*** 1 
   
ROA 0.0813*** -0.0184 0.3713*** 0.1099*** -0.1236*** -0.2328*** 1 
  
BIG4 0.0612** -0.0310 0.0588** -0.0364 -0.0724*** 0.0010 0.0032 1 
 
IND  -0.0486*  0.0839*** -0.2837*** -0.0194 0.2509*** 0.0335  -0.0439  -0.0447 1 
Note: The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients among the selected variables. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Variables: AEM is the absolute value of discretionary accruals; CSR_Score is score of ESG rating. REM is sum of real earnings management proxies measured as abnormal cash flows 
plus abnormal discretionary expenses minus the abnormal production costs. GROWTH is percentage change in sales. SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total long-term debt 
to total assets ratio. ROA is ratio between net income and total assets. BIG4 dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company is audited by a Big Four firm and “0” otherwise. IND dummy 
variable that assumes “1” if the company’s industry is CSR sensitive and “0” if not.  
 
Appendix IV. Variance Inflation Factors regarding the independent variables of AEM and REM regressions, respectively.  
 
Variable CSR_Score AEM REM GROWTH SIZE LEV ROA BIG4 IND 
VIF AEM 1.50 - 1.29 1.03 1.65 1.09 1.23 1.01 1.15 
VIF REM 1.50 1.10 - 1.03 1.69 1.09 1.09 1.01 1.07 
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Appendix V. Results from the AEM and REM multiple regressions on CSR, with two measures of REM 
 
Variable 
AEM DACC REM AB_CFO AB_DEXP 




0.7517*** 0.5294*** -0.4773*** 0.9392*** 




0.0409*** 0.1487*** 0.0294* 0.1193*** 
(3.06) (5.35) (1.89) (5.20) 
AEM - - 
-0.2875*** -0.3376*** 0.0501 










-0.1506*** -0.0179 -0.0691*** 0.0512*** 




-0.0324*** -0.0193*** 0.0209*** -0.0402*** 




-0.0485*** -0.0592** -0.0250 -0.0342 




0.1813*** 1.0502*** 0.8720*** 0.1783** 




-0.0043 0.0274*** 0.0238*** 0.0035 




0.0067* -0.1044*** -0.0374*** -0.0670*** 
(1.82) (-13.78) (-7.84) (-10.41) 
Observations 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 
R-squared 0.1564 0.3767 0.2741 0.4298 0.2036 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1447 0.3680 0.2641 0.4219 0.1926 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at firm year level with year and country fixed effects. T-stat values are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Variables: AEM is the absolute value of discretionary accruals; DACC is signed discretionary accruals; CSR_Score is score of ESG rating. REM is sum 
of real earnings management proxies, abnormal cash flows (AB_CFO) plus abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_DEXP). GROWTH is percentage change in sales. SIZE is natural 
logarithm of total assets. LEV is total long-term debt to total assets ratio. ROA is ratio between net income and total assets. BIG4 dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company is 
audited by a Big Four firm and “0” otherwise. IND dummy variable that assumes “1” if the company’s industry is CSR sensitive and “0” if not. 
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Appendix VI. Results from the AEM and REM multiple regressions on CSR, robustness test 
 
Variable 
AEM DACC REM AB_CFO AB_PROD AB_DEXP 
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
constant 
0.3475*** 0.5932*** 1.0794*** -0.5054*** -0.8526*** 0.7323*** 
(8.47) (12.75) (5.25) (-7.15) (-6.80) (9.57) 
CSR_Score 
-0.0257* 0.0437*** 0.1755** -0.0143 -0.0923* 0.0976*** 
(-1.96) (2.69) (2.50) (-0.69) (-1.97) (3.81) 
REM 
0.0003 -0.0566*** 
- - - - 
(0.04) (-6.03) 
AEM - - 
0.0082 -0.0684 0.0629 0.1394 
(0.04) (-0.66) (0.48) (1.55) 
GROWTH 
-0.0136 -0.1824*** 0.1438** -0.0373 -0.1270* 0.0542* 
(-0.91) (-6.30) (2.08) (-1.92) (-2.40) (2.19) 
SIZE 
-0.0117*** -0.0272*** -0.0443*** 0.0246*** 0.0378*** -0.0311*** 
(-6.18) (-12.31) (-4.75) (7.75) (6.57) (-8.70) 
LEV 
-0.0218* -0.0289 0.0357 -0.0483* -0.1028* -0.0189 
(-1.72) (-1.55) (0.47) (-2.08) (-2.22) (-0.68) 
ROA 
0.0279 0.0532 1.3946*** 0.7680*** -0.4823*** 0.1443* 
(1.01) (0.80) (5.02) (7.08) (-4.01) (2.03) 
BIG4 
0.0063 -0.0038 0.0546** 0.0169* -0.0273 0.0105 
(1.28) (-0.67) (2.01) (2.22) (-1.56) (1.12) 
IND 
0.0054 0.0273*** -0.1634*** -0.0530*** 0.0691*** -0.0414*** 
(1.36) (5.48) (-8.82) (-7.97) (5.62) (-5.98) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 
R-squared 0.1491 0.3450 0.2722 0.4562 0.1898 0.2100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1268 0.3278 0.2531 0.4419 0.1686 0.1893 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at firm year level. T-stat values are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The expected signal column refers to the magnitude of accruals and REM. Variables: AEM is the absolute value of discretionary accruals; DACC is signed discretionary accruals; CSR_Score 
is score of ESG rating. REM is sum of real earnings management proxies, abnormal cash flows plus abnormal discretionary expenses minus the abnormal production costs. GROWTH is 
percentage change in sales. SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total long-term debt to total assets ratio. ROA is ratio between net income and total assets. BIG4 dummy variable 
that assumes “1” if the company is audited by a Big Four firm and “0”otherwise. IND dummy variable that assumes “1”if the company’s industry is CSR sensitive and “0”if not. 
 
